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ST. DoUrg LAW ZV XW
The estate in entirety is lii d to the oxtinmtlO of the mgrrtae rels-
tianship and cannot exis indezpndem of it. In tids case, the marrage was ter-
minated by death and. both parties having perished t the same instant, the
estate in entirely descended i equal moieties to the heirs of each, as if the hus-
band and wife had been tenats in cwoau .
While tenancy. in entir4y has been aboished by statate in some Anerikan
States and in others held to be inferentially abolised by the paage of stat-
utes givim to married wowen the rights of fews soe, yet A st1 exists in a
great many States as at commes law or by statute. See Section 2175. R. S. Mis-
souri, 1919.
LIENS-UNRECORDED, FOR THE INON-PAYMENT OF FEDERAL
TAXES.
In the ease of United States v. Curry, 201 Fed. 371. the defendant was a
manufacturer of oleomargatine, that product being subject to an excise duty
levied by the Federal Government. An assessment was received by the Internal
Revenue Collestor and demand was made on the defendant, and at that time
she was the owner of certain real estate situated in the State of Maryland.
Shortly after demand for payment of the tax was made, the defendant con-
veyed and mortgaged said real estate to innocent purchasers and mortgagees
who are joined as defendants in this action.
Section 3186, Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S Compiled
Statutes, 1901, p. 2073) provides that "if any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same on demand, the amount shall be a lien in
favor of the United States from the time the assessment list was received by
the Colletor-." The action was brought by the United States under this
statute to set aside the conveyaences to these purchasers to the extent that they
conflicted with the Government's lien on the property. It was held by the Court
that the lien of the Government for delinquent taxes attached to all the real
estate of the defendant at the time of the assessment and demand by the Col-
lector and that said lien had priority over any subsequent conveyance or mort-
gage whatever, even though it be to an innocent purchaser without notice of
the lien.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also held that the Govern-
ment's iers is unaffected by the fact that a subsequent purchaser became such
without knowledge that the Government had a claim upon the property. Also
that the lien of the Government is not sufect to the laws of the State where
the land is situated, respecting the recording of liens. Unfted States v. Snyder,
149 U. S. 210; Blacldocc v. Unted States, 135 U. S. 326; see also United
States v. Turner, 28 Fed. Cases 232.
It will be seen that such a ruling (a strict enforcement of the statute)
works a great hardship on bona-fide purchasers who have no notice, either ac-
tual or constructive, of the Government's lien. It was aptly stated by Judge
Rose in the present case that it should be provided that the Collector of Internal
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Revenue, at the time he maked *be demand upom the taxpayer, should send a
copy of the demand to some office in wbich liens upo= real estate are re-
corded and "the records of which are consequently carefully examined by cob-
veyancers.!
PLEADING--"REAL PARTY IN INTEREST"--SUBROGATION OF
INSURER.
The case of Sexton v. Anderson Electric Car Co., 234 S. W. 358, was a
suit to recover damages for injury to an electric automobile. The owner had
taken the car to defendant's place of business for inspection and overhauling.
Previous to its return employees of defendant while testing it out collided with
a lamp post wrecking the car. At the time of collision the owner carried
$1,800 insurance on the car to cover loss restting from such accidents. This
amount was paid to owner by the Insurance Company and he transferred all
his right, title, and interest in and to the wrecked car to the Insurarce Com-
pany. The insurance policy contained a stipulation that in case the Insurance
Company paid a loss as stated above they would be subrogated to all the rights
of owner of car in an action for damages against any third party, and that such
action should be brought in the name of the owner of the car. In accordance
with this stipulation the Insurance Company brought a suit in the name of the
car owner against the third party resulting in a verdict for plaintiff. After
the overruling of a motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Defendant
claimed the court erred in refusing to give the peremptory inmtructim to the
effect that the owner was not the "real party in interest!' Upon being ques-
tioned, the owner of car said that after he had received the money from the
Insurance Company he had no interest in the result of the lawsuit; that he
claimed no right of action personally and that he considered the action brought
for the benefit of the company. It would seem that altho the company could
properly bring such an action they should bring it in their own name and not
in the name of the owner of the car.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the bringing of suit in the name
of the owner of car was proper and Ithe judgment 'of the lower court was af-
firmed. The Judge in the opinion cited a number of cases supporting the doc-
trine of subrogation in cases such as the one under consideration. Railway Co.
v. Blunt & Ward (C. C.) 165 Fed. loc. cit. 260; Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc.
v. Standard Oil Company, 59 Fed. 987; Foster v. Railway, 143 Mo. ApM. 547;
Matthews v. Railroad, 142 Mo. 645. There can be no doubt as to the doctrine
of subrogation set forth i the above cases or in the case of Sexton Y. Ander-
son Electric Car Co., 234 S. W. 358, but there might possibly be a question as
to why in that case action was not brought in the name of the Insurance Com-
pany rather than the owner of the car. At common law this would have been
the action since it had to be brought in the name of the assured. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Railway Co., 74 Mo. App. 106, and L. & G. W. Steam-
ship Cx, v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, are cases similar to above, both
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